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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Cross-Appellant New Union Department of Environmental
Protection (NUDEP) seeks review of the final decision of the
United States District Court for the District of New Union issued
on June 1, 2012. (R. at 1). This Court retains proper jurisdiction
to hear appeals from final decisions of the district court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case, as the underlying issues arose under
the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2006). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over
questions of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Whether the New Union Wildlife Federation (NUWF) has
organizational standing under a traditional standing analysis
where it can demonstrate that its individual members have
suffered a concrete and particular injury through impaired
enjoyment of the Muddy River fairly traceable to the Jim Bob
Bowman’s (Bowman) conduct, and the injury is redressable by
this Court.
II. Whether Bowman’s violation of Section 404 of the CWA
was wholly in the past such that subject matter jurisdiction does
not attach where Bowman ceased dredging the wetland before
NUWF filed its lawsuit, there is no indication that he will restart
any dredging activity, and he has already agreed to penalties for
the prior actions.
III. Whether NUDEP’s calculated strategy to seek a consent
decree and settlement agreement from Bowman constitutes
diligent prosecution as to bar NUWF’s lawsuit where NUDEP
exacted non-monetary penalties, courts accord deference to
Agency enforcement, and NUWF had ample opportunity to
intervene in the initial enforcement action.
IV. Whether Bowman’s movement of dirt and vegetation
from one part of his wetland to another without a permit violates
Section 404 of the CWA where the EPA’s definition and
subsequent judicial interpretation of discharge of dredged and fill
material incorporates clearing of wetlands for agricultural use.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order granting summary
judgment in the United States District Court for the District of
New Union on June 1, 2012. (R. at 2). NUWF challenged
Bowman’s improper clearing and filling of his wetland without a
permit under Sections 301(a) and 404 of the CWA on August 30,
2011. (R. at 4). Prior to NUWF’s federal lawsuit, NUDEP used
its discretion as the state agency charged with implementing the
CWA to diligently prosecute Bowman for violations of the statute.
(R. at 4). NUDEP intervened in NUWF’s federal suit to ensure
that its prior prosecution was accorded appropriate status by the
court. (R. at 4). Pursuant to a finding that Bowman’s activities
did not create an addition of fill material to his wetland, the
district court granted Bowman’s summary judgment motion on
all grounds. (R. at 2).
NUDEP appeals the lower court’s finding that NUWF lacked
standing, arguing that the facts in the record demonstrate that
NUWF’s individual members show an actual, concrete injury. (R.
at 1). The lower court appropriately relied on the standard in
Gwaltney to find that Bowman’s actions were wholly in the past
prior to NUWF’s federal lawsuit; NUDEP respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the lower court’s decision as to subject
matter jurisdiction. (R. at 2). NUDEP further asks this Court to
affirm the lower court’s decision that NUDEP’s prior prosecution
was procedurally and substantively diligent as to bar NUWF’s
lawsuit. (R. at 2). Last, because the lower court did not accord
proper deference to the EPA’s interpretation of dredge and fill
material, NUDEP respectfully requests that this Court overturn
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for lack of a CWA
Section 404 permit.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 15, 2011, Bowman began clearing his wetland by
pushing existing vegetation into artificial trenches without a
permit. (R. at 4). He moved this uprooted vegetation and soil
from one part of his land to another with a bulldozer when
clearing it to plant wheat. (R. at 4). He excavated a wide ditch to
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drain his newly-formed field into the Muddy River, to which his
land is hydrologically connected. (R. at 3-4). Bowman completed
all clearing and filling activities on approximately July 15, 2011.
(R. at 4). After learning of Bowman’s activities in July 2011,
NUDEP, carrying out its authority to implement the CWA, sent
Bowman a notice of violation of state and federal law. (R. at 4).
Bowman entered into a settlement agreement with NUDEP,
consenting not to clear more wetland and granting a permanent
conservation easement of land adjacent to the Muddy River. (R.
at 4). NUDEP did not seek monetary penalties from Bowman,
exercising its judgment as the agency charged with implementing
the CWA. (R. at 4).
In addition to its settlement agreement, NUDEP brought suit
against Bowman in federal court on August 10, 2011. (R. at 5).
NUWF, a non-profit organization whose mission is to protect the
habitats of the State of New Union’s fish and wildlife, filed suit
against Bowman in federal court on August 30, 2011, more than
twenty days after NUDEP’s suit. (R. at 4-5). NUDEP waited
approximately one month to file a motion to enter a consent
decree, identical to the state settlement agreement previously
agreed to by both NUDEP and Bowman. (R. at 4-5). NUDEP
intervened in NUWF’s suit against Bowman to ensure that its
previous administrative order and consent decree were accorded
controlling status by the Court. (R. at 5).
In its suit against Bowman, three members of NUWF
testified that they each use the Muddy River for recreational
fishing and boating, and they picnic on its banks near Bowman’s
land. (R. at 6). NUWF members stated that they feel a loss from
the destruction of the wetlands, and are aware of differences in
the River. (R. at 6). One member, Mr. Norton, can no longer find
frogs in the cleared wetland. (R. at 6). Another testified that the
River looks more polluted after Bowman’s decimation of the
wetland. (R. at 6). In its suit against Bowman, NUWF is seeking
monetary penalties and a court order requiring Bowman to
restore the wetlands. (R. at 5).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case comes before this Court on appeal from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is
appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
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and. . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Questions of law are reviewed de novo
by this Court. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557 (1988).
This Court should therefore review Appellants’ claims de novo
and afford no deference to the opinions and conclusions of the
district court. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court improperly granted summary judgment for
Bowman on the issues of NUWF’s standing and Bowman’s
violation of CWA Section 404 and properly granted summary
judgment on the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and diligent
prosecution.
The lower court misinterpreted the requirements of
individual standing in Article III of the Constitution and
Laidlaw.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs.(TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588 (D.S.C. 1997), aff’d, 528 U.S.
167 (2000). Instead, NUWF has standing to challenge Bowman’s
filling of his wetlands without a permit under Section 404
because it demonstrated a concrete and particularized injury for
all of its testifying members. The broad standing test, as
elucidated by the Supreme Court in Laidlaw, is consistent with
Congress’s intent in passing the CWA.
The district court properly decided that Bowman’s filling of
his wetlands was wholly in the past for the purposes of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Per the holding of Gwaltney, because
Bowman came into compliance with NUDEP’s settlement
agreement, and because NUDEP did not require the removal of
dredged and fill materials, Bowman’s actions had ended before
NUWF filed its federal lawsuit. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The continuing
presence of dredged materials does not constitute a continuing
violation under EPA regulations. Because Bowman filled all of
the wetland at issue, the single incident, wholly in the past,
renders the lower court without subject matter jurisdiction.
The lower court also correctly granted summary judgment for
Bowman on diligent prosecution, as NUDEP’s settlement
agreement and subsequent consent decrees were both
substantively and procedurally diligent. Because NUDEP is the
state agency charged with implementing the CWA, it has broad
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discretion to enforce the Act in the interests of public policy. The
lower court properly determined that NUDEP diligently
prosecuted Bowman for his violation of the CWA.
Finally, the district court improperly determined that
Bowman’s activities did not require a Section 404 permit because
it failed to consider, let alone give proper deference to, the EPA’s
interpretation of the CWA. The lower court incorrectly held that
Bowman’s clearing and filling of the wetland did not constitute
dredged material. Courts consistently find landclearing activities
like Bowman’s to be addition of a pollutant as either dredged or
fill material. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1983). Public policy also dictates that agencies, not
the courts, are the proper entities to determine the character of
the CWA violation.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE NEW UNION WILDLIFE FEDERATION HAS
ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING BECAUSE ITS
MEMBERS MEET THE BROAD REQUIREMENTS
OF TRADITIONAL INDIVIDUAL STANDING.

Section II of Article III of the United States Constitution
limits federal judicial power to cases and controversies. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. Every suit brought in federal court must meet
the case or controversy minimum requirement.
Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). An organization may
bring suit on behalf of its members if it can establish that at least
one member would have individual standing, the organization’s
interest in the suit is germane to its purpose, and individual
member participation is unnecessary. Hunt v. Wash. Apple
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The Supreme Court
has determined that an individual plaintiff must establish that
he or she suffered an injury in fact which is (1) “(a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent,” (2) fairly traceable to
the defendant’s actions, and (3) likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Lujan was broadened in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp.
588 (D.S.C. 1997), aff’d, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), such that a plaintiff
need not demonstrate actual or particular harm.
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NUWF has organizational standing as it can establish that
three of its individual members suffered an injury in fact fairly
traceable to Bowman’s conduct that would be redressed by a
favorable decision of this Court. This Court should reverse the
district court’s holding and find that NUWF meets the
requirements of standing set forth by the Supreme Court in
Laidlaw.
A. NUWF Has Organizational Standing.
NUWF can establish that it has organizational standing to
bring suit against Bowman for violations of Sections 301(a) and
404 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344 (2006). There exists
a strong presumption to grant standing, as the purpose of citizen
suits are to protect and advance the public’s interest in pollutionfree waterways, not to promote private interests. Penn. Envtl.
Def. Found. v. Bellefonte Borough, 718 F. Supp. 431, 434 (M.D.
Pa. 1989).
The inquiry in the instant case into organizational standing
centers on whether NUWF can offer sufficient evidence that “its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Under the broad definition of
injury in fact established by the Supreme Court in Laidlaw,
NUWF can demonstrate that its individual members have
individual standing. (R. at 6). NUWF’s mission statement and
purpose is “to protect the fish and wildlife of the state by
protecting their habitats.” (R. at 4). Its lawsuit against Bowman
for violation of the CWA is therefore germane to its purpose.
Last, no individual member need participate in the suit as the
remedies requested do not require individualized proof and are
properly resolved in a group context. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
B. NUWF Meets the Requirements of Individual
Standing for Affiant Members.
The standing provisions of Section 505 of the CWA authorize
suit “against any person who is alleged to be in violation” by “any
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), (g) (2006). The tripartite
standing test articulated in Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
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(1982), noted that Article III requires the party who invokes the
court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some
actual legal or threatened injury. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Laidlaw established that “the relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing. . . is not injury to the environment but injury
to the plaintiff.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. NUWF’s individual
members have a concrete and imminent “injury in fact” under the
Laidlaw analysis, as demonstrated by testimony of conditional
use of the Muddy River. Similarly, NUWF sufficiently pled that
the actual injury is fairly traceable to Bowman’s conduct and that
the relief requested will redress the injuries. (R. at 4). The broad
latitude afforded plaintiffs in establishing standing reflects the
fact that the federal government and states lack the resources to
enforce environmental law in every case, and as a result are able
to enforce only the most egregious of violations. See Jonathan H.
Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and
Environmental Protection, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 39, 44, 49
(2001).
1. NUWF’s three affiant members have an injury
in fact that is concrete and imminent that
confers standing upon the organization.
The district court incorrectly determined that the affidavits
of the three NUWF members did not demonstrate an injury in
fact. An injury can be a harm to aesthetic, recreational or
environmental values and it need not be large – “identifiable
trifle” will suffice. United States v. Students Challenging Reg.
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973). To meet the
Laidlaw standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she
uses “the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic
and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the
challenged activity” and that these submissions of proof are more
than mere “general averments” and “conclusory allegations.”
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888). A
plaintiff’s affected interest becomes an injury when the threat to
that interest is actual and imminent; intentions alone absent any
kind of concrete plan to visit the area do not support a finding of
actual or imminent injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. There is
no “particular formula for establishing a sufficient concrete and
particularized aesthetic or recreational injury-in-fact.” Ecological
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Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).
As a result, in each case before it, the Court must determine
whether the plaintiff’s interest in the area is factually based on
the stated use or enjoyment of the affected waterway and
whether that use would be lessened as a result of the defendant’s
conduct. Ecological Rights, 230 F.3d at 1141.
Articulated in Laidlaw, a concrete and imminent injury need
not reflect an injury to the environment. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at
157. In Laidlaw, the affidavits and testimony presented by the
plaintiffs asserted the existence of the defendant’s alleged
discharges along with the affiant members’ reasonable concerns
about the effects of those discharges. Id. Further, individual
members of Friends of the Earth averred that the defendant’s
probable discharges directly affected their recreational, aesthetic,
and economic interests in the North Tyga River. Id. at 169. The
injuries to the plaintiffs’ ability to recreationally use the river and
its banks, as well as an aversion to the river’s smell and
appearance satisfied the stricter requirements of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife for concrete and particular pleadings. Id. at
183. Taking these affirmations together, the Court found that
individual members had established an injury in fact as to confer
standing upon the umbrella organization. Id. at 169. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendant’s discharges did
no cognizable harm to the river even as it found that the
plaintiffs’ injuries, which were based on a perceived harm to the
river, merited standing. Id. at 181. The language of the Act itself
requires only a violation and an interested party to produce a
lawsuit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). Based on the Court’s analysis in
Laidlaw, courts will grant standing when an entity allegedly
violates the Act, and then the prospective plaintiff alters his or
her behavior according to the simple belief that the waterway has
suffered harm. The belief itself, along with the alleged violation
of the Act, confers upon plaintiffs an injury in fact that satisfies
the Laidlaw standard.
In the instant case, NUWF submitted three affidavits from
its members which detailed a concrete connection to the allegedly
polluted waterway and actual recreational use of it. (R. at 6). All
individual members continually use “the Muddy for recreational
boating and fishing, often picnicking on its banks, or in the
vicinity of Bowman’s property.” (R. at 6). Each member is
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further aware of differences in the River after Bowman cleared
and filled the wetlands – they fear that it is more polluted and
will become even more polluted if other wetlands along the river
are cleared and filled for agricultural purposes. (R. at 6). One
member specifically testified that the river looks more polluted
now, after Bowman’s land was filled. (R. at 6). The concerns
about the effects of Bowman’s actions and their effects on the
Muddy River mirror those upon which the Supreme Court
granted standing in Laidlaw.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 157.
Following the Laidlaw analysis, NUWF’s members need not
include any “hard data” to establish that the Muddy River is
polluted, only their belief that it may be. Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp.
at 588 (holding that the simple, genuine belief that the river was
more polluted was sufficiently concrete to establish injury in fact).
For standing, the Act itself requires only a violation and an
interested plaintiff, not that the defendant’s behavior negatively
impacts the plaintiff’s current or future use of the affected area.
David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment,
and Other Contested Terms, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 79, 86 (2004).
Through their conditional use of the area for recreational
purposes and fear that the river is more polluted, NUWF
members have established a concrete and actual injury per the
requirements of Laidlaw.
The lower court determined that Mr. Norton’s trespass upon
Bowman’s land could not constitute an injury in fact. However,
case law suggests that inquiry into a plaintiff’s illegal behavior is
improper in determining whether the standing requirements
have been met. See Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp.
2d 1169, 1183 (D. Idaho 2001) (holding that the organization
could bring its citizens suit because of the broader purpose of the
CWA even if one or more of its members violated the CWA
themselves). The injury to Mr. Norton’s enjoyment of the affected
waters can similarly meet the requirements of Laidlaw. He
testified that “there are no frogs in the drained field and he is
lucky to find two or three good sized frogs in the remaining woods
and buffer area.” (R. at 6). As a direct result of Bowman’s
clearing and draining of the wetlands, Mr. Norton can no longer
use the area for recreation. While a NUDEP biologist testified
that, once fully established, the buffer zone “will provide a higher
quality habitat, and more of it, for frogs,” Mr. Norton has still
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suffered an injury to his current and future enjoyment of the
Muddy River. (R. at 6). As Laidlaw noted, for standing, the
injury demonstrated must be to the plaintiff, not the
environment. Certainly, Mr. Norton’s ability to enjoy the River
and adjacent land has been lessened by Bowman’s decimation of
the wetland.
2. The injuries sustained by NUWF members are
fairly traceable to Bowman’s conduct and are
redressable by this Court.
To meet the second prong of the standing test under Laidlaw,
plaintiffs need only show that the defendant’s violations
contributed to their injury. Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990). As
expressed in Powell Duffryn, plaintiffs need not show “to a
scientific certainty” that the pollution perceived in the waterway
comes from the defendant. Id. at 73 n.10.
The Fifth Circuit similarly found a fairly traceable injury
where an organization alleged that the defendant lacked a
permit, such that any discharge would violate the CWA, and the
discharges occurring were typical of those which harm water
quality and marine life. Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996). NUWF members
affirmed that they were aware that wetlands serve valuable
functions in maintaining integrity of rivers. (R. at 6). NUWF’s
submitted affidavits included statements that the “Muddy looks
more polluted. . . than it did prior to Bowman’s activities.” (R. at
6). This statement detailing the effects of the filling of Bowman’s
wetlands, typical of harmful discharge, satisfies the requirements
of the Fifth Circuit for the second prong of the standing test.
Similarly, that there were significantly fewer frogs in the
area demonstrates that Bowman’s clearing and filling of his land
is directly traceable to the injury alleged. (R. at 6). As to proof of
causation, “rather than pinpointing the origins or particular
molecules, a plaintiff must merely show that a defendant. . .
causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged in the
specific geographic area of concern.” Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2000). Both the
Ninth and Third Circuits agree that the causal connection need
not be so airtight in establishing standing as to demonstrate that
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the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits, only that there exists a
substantial likelihood that the defendant’s conduct caused the
plaintiff’s harm. Id.; see also Powell Duffryn, 913 F.3d at 72.
To satisfy the last prong of the standing requirement –
redressability – courts only require that the kind of damages
sought will address the specific harms endured. An injunction to
restore the wetlands or civil penalties, as sought by NUWF,
would satisfy the redressability requirement for constitutional
standing. Sw. Marine, 236 F.3d at 995. Civil penalties may
further redress the injury suffered by a plaintiff if they will serve
as a deterrent to future polluting. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 73.
If the penalties sought are imposed upon Bowman, other wouldbe polluters along the Muddy River may think twice about filling
their wetlands.
C. Congress’s Intent in Including a Citizen Suit
Provision in the Clean Water Act Is Best
Honored by Granting Standing to NUWF.
The disposition of the instant case will implicate not only the
standing doctrine itself, but that of general environmental
protection as well. Congress passed the CWA with the intent to
provide protection for the nation’s waterways from pollution.
Within the Act itself, Congress intended to eliminate as many
barriers to citizen standing as possible as it charged private
citizens with acting as private attorneys general when
enforcement agencies would or could not. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
Congress often includes citizen suits or similar enforcement
mechanisms to ensure that its broad goals are met. See Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a
Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 Duke L.J.
1170, 1195 (1993). The inherent narrowness of the Supreme
Court’s current standing doctrine has a significant effect upon
who may sue: this fact causes an asymmetry in the cases the
courts do hear as the doctrine admits regulated entities easily,
while regulatory beneficiaries who bring citizen suits to enforce
the Act are more likely to lack standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at
561-62 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984) (“when
the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or
inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is
ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish”).
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Were this Court to deny standing to NUWF, it would
disregard Congress’s intent in granting citizens the ability to sue.
Because the CWA itself only requires interested parties and a
violation, granting standing in the instant case furthers this
broad policy goal of private involvement in environmental
protection. Ensuring that those non-regulated entities have
access to the courts acknowledges Congress’s goals as well as
protects the future of the standing doctrine: “there are certain
kinds of cases in which the doctrine may be impossible to satisfy
and yet we believe access to the courts is desirable[,]” such as
suits directly involving the interests of future generations.
Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems,
91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 181 (2011). Vigorous enforcement of the
CWA will likely deter similar undesirable activities, thereby
protecting the system from future threats. For these reasons,
this Court should reverse the district court’s holding and find
that NUWF has organizational standing.
II.

THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION UNDER CLEAN WATER ACT
SECTION 505 BECAUSE BOWMAN’S ACTIONS DO
NOT CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING VIOLATION.

Section 505(a) of the CWA provides authority for citizen suits
and gives courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases
involving violations of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). To bring suit
under Section 505(a), a defendant must be “alleged to be in
violation of an effluent standard or limitation” of the CWA. Id.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the language of Section 505(a)
requires that for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction,
violations must be alleged to be continuous or intermittent at the
time the suit is brought, and cannot have been completed wholly
in the past. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). There are no competing
interpretations of the plain-language meaning of “continuous” nor
does NUWF argue in the instant case that the material
constitutes an intermittent violation of the Act. Because of the
statute’s legislative history and continued judicial deference to
Agency orders, courts will have subject matter jurisdiction only
for present and future violations of the Act.
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The Supreme Court’s ruling in Gwaltney is the measure for
district courts to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
attaches to a violation of CWA Section 404. District courts have
clarified that CWA Section 404 violations are not considered
continuing after a party comes into compliance with Agency
orders, if the removal of dredged and fill materials has not been
ordered. Orange Env’t, Inc., v. Cnty. of Orange, 923 F. Supp. 529
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because Bowman was already in compliance with the prior
Agency order, per the requirements of Gwaltney, at the time that
NUWF filed its lawsuit.
NUWF incorrectly argues that
continuing CWA Section 404 violations should be held to a
different and higher standard than continuing violations of CWA
Section 402. (R. at 7). Yet, this proposition is unsupported by
case law, statute or legislative intent. This Court should affirm
the district court’s holding that Bowman’s activities did not meet
the necessary threshold for subject matter jurisdiction based on
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)’s requirement that a violation be continuous
or intermittent.
A. Bowman’s Violation of Clean Water Act Section
404 Was Wholly in the Past Before NUWF Filed
Suit.
In Gwaltney, appellees claimed that CWA Section 505(a)
gives authority to citizens to seek relief even when these
violations were “wholly past” and have little chance of recurrence.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 55. In its decision, the Court held that
violations of Section 505(a) must be continuous or intermittent for
subject matter jurisdiction to attach. Id. Looking first to the
language of the statute, the Gwaltney Court found that, while
somewhat ambiguous, “[t]he most natural reading of ‘to be in
violation’ is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of
either continuous or intermittent violation.”
Id. at 57.
“Congress,” it continued, “could have phrased its requirement in
language that looked to the past (‘to have violated’), but it did not
choose this readily available option.” Id. The Court also found
that as other sections of the Act, such as Section 309(d),
purposely use the past tense to cover previous events, the will of
Congress was that Section 404 violations must be current for
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courts to have subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 57-59. It further
ruled that Congressional history demonstrated that the language
was specifically chosen for Section 505 to encompass present and
future violations. Id. at 50. Legislative history provided that
citizen suits are “not [intended] to remedy wholly past violations.”
Id.
Bowman’s violation of CWA Section 404 was wholly in the
past before NUWF filed suit against him on August 30, 2011, as
he had ceased dredging the wetland on his property by July 15,
2011. (R. at 4). Bowman’s activities are not continuous, as his
landclearing activities were interrupted on July 15, 2011, when
he ceased clearing his wetland. (R. at 4). Neither are his
activities intermittent as there is no reason to believe, and
NUWF does not assert, that he plans to restart his dredging
activities in the future. Extending the Gwaltney reasoning, a
single, discrete incident in the past would not grant courts subject
matter jurisdiction. Likewise, Bowman’s single violation of the
CWA does not constitute a continuing or intermittent violation.
Bowman, after being provided notice, ceased his violations of
Section 404 and agreed with NUDEP’s proposal for remedy. (R.
at 4-5). Therefore, by August 30, 2011, when NUWF filed its
lawsuit, Bowman’s actions were wholly in the past. (R. at 5).
NUWF argues that the CWA Section 402 violations and
dredged or fill material covered under Section 404 must be
treated differently. (R. at 7). The Gwaltney Court does not
distinguish between the types of effluence in each section, but
instead repeatedly looks to the language of the Act for guidance.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-62.
While NUWF argues for a
delineation between Section 402 effluence and Section 404
dredged or fill materials, the Court in Gwaltney rightly did not
make such a distinction. Id. As the district court states, “many §
402 violations involve the discharge of solids or sediment which
settle on the water bottom below or shortly downstream from the
outfall and can be removed.” (R. at 7). Therefore, not only is
NUWF’s argument contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court, it
offends logic and public policy to suggest that depositing Section
404 materials into a water is a continuing violation until they are
removed, while releasing Section 402 effluence should be
considered a wholly past offense even when it is removed just as
easily. (R. at 7).
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B. Granting Subject Matter Jurisdiction Would
Usurp the Right of the State Agency to Act in the
Best Interests of All Citizens.
The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the notice
provision in the CWA is to give an alleged violator the
opportunity to come into compliance with the Act and to allow the
Administrator or the State to follow up with actions. Gwaltney,
484 U.S. at 60-61. Construing the notice provision, the Gwaltney
Court reasoned that the purpose of giving sixty days notice before
filing a suit, not only to the State and Administrator, but the
alleged violator as well, was to allow the violator the opportunity
to come into compliance with the Act. Id. It would “render
incomprehensible § 505’s notice provision” if citizen suits could
“target wholly past violations.” Id. at 59-60. The Court found
that “the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in
the present or the future, not the past,” therefore, suits brought
after an Administrator had assessed penalties, would curtail
agency “discretion to enforce the Act in the public interest.” Id. at
59-61. Curtailing the notice provision would have the effect of
changing “the nature of the citizens’ role from interstitial to
potentially intrusive.” Id. at 61.
It is uncontroverted that Bowman ceased his landclearing
activities on July 15, 2011, after NUWF issued notice to him on
July 1, 2011, and before it filed its federal lawsuit on August 30,
2011. (R. at 4-5). Furthermore, because NUDEP exacted
penalties from Bowman in the form of developing and
maintaining a new artificial wetland, giving the State a
conservation easement for public use, and a restriction from
developing these areas in any way, giving the Court subject
matter jurisdiction would remove the Agency’s ability to enforce
the CWA in the public interest, per Gwaltney. Gwaltney, 484
U.S. at 61.
NUWF erroneously relies on Sasser v. Administrator, 990
F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993) because the Fourth Circuit held that
each day Section 404 dredged and fill material “remains in the
wetlands without a permit constitutes an additional day of
violation.” In ruling against the landowner in Sasser, the court
noted that not only had the violations been ongoing, but that
there had been no effort to work with the EPA or the Army Corp
of Engineers despite repeated notices and citations. Id at 128.
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The court’s holding that the violation was continuous was only in
the context of the landowner’s refusal to work with the EPA, who
had demanded that the deposited materials be removed. Id. at
129. Unlike NUWF, the EPA in Sasser was not bringing a citizen
suit, but was instead enforcing the issuance of an order under 33
U.S.C. § 1311, due to the plaintiff’s repeated refusal to come into
compliance with the CWA. Id. at 128.
On August 10, 2011, after receiving notice from NUWF,
NUDEP stepped in to resolve Bowman’s violations. (R. at 5). An
agreement was reached that will effectively recreate a wetland
while enhancing public recreation. (R. at 5). According deference
to Agency orders ensures that citizen-suits will not usurp the
state’s authority to work toward the public good. This Court
should accord the Agency deference and recognize the finality of
its orders by not extending subject matter jurisdiction.
III.

THE NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION’S PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE DILIGENT PROSECUTION
BARS THE NEW UNION WILDLIFE FEDERATION’S
CITIZEN SUIT.

Under the CWA, even when a citizen has standing, the
citizen’s lawsuit will be barred if the state diligently prosecutes
the alleged CWA violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2006).
Section 505 of the CWA states in pertinent part that no citizen
suit may be commenced if the “Administrator or State has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action
in a court of the United States” provided that citizens have the
opportunity to intervene in such suit. Id. The Supreme Court
concisely restated this requirement in Gwaltney, when it stated
that “citizen suits are proper only if the Federal, State, and local
agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility.”
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. NUDEP’s settlement agreement with
Bowman, the resulting administrative order, and NUDEP’s
subsequent federal lawsuit constitute diligent prosecution,
barring NUWF’s citizen suit.
A. NUDEP’s Consent Decree and Settlement
Agreement Lack Procedural Defects and Should
Be Afforded Considerable Deference by the
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Court.
While it is true that an agency’s consent decree must
demonstrate actual diligence in prosecution, citizens “bear the
burden of proving the state agency’s prosecution was not diligent.
This burden is a heavy one because diligence on the part of the
enforcement agency is presumed.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. (Laidlaw I), 890 F.
Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995). This presumption, especially for consent
agreements, stems from the agency’s unique position to consider
the best solution for all interested parties, not just potential
plaintiffs. Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp.
1140, 1147 (E.D. Ark. 1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994).
Courts recognize settlement agreements and consent
decrees as procedurally acceptable methods of diligent
prosecution. The Supreme Court recognized that “if citizens
could file suit. . . in order to seek the civil penalties that the
Administrator chose to forgo, then the Administrator’s discretion
to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed
considerably.” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. The Tenth Circuit
explained that while requiring diligence, “Section 1365(b)(1)(B)
[of the CWA] does not require government prosecution to be farreaching or zealous. . . Nor must an agency’s prosecutorial
strategy coincide with that of the citizen-plaintiff.” Karr v.
Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007). Courts defer to
Agency judgment when negotiating consent decrees because if
defendants are “exposed to a citizen suit whenever the EPA
grants it a concession, defendants will have little incentive to
negotiate consent decrees.” Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197. The Eighth
Circuit followed the same reasoning when it stated that “[i]t
would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find failure to
diligently prosecute simply because [defendants] prevailed in
some fashion or because a compromise was reached.” Ark.
Wildlife Fed’n., 29 F.3d at 380. Furthermore, failing to defer to
an agency’s judgment in assessing proper remedies undermines
Congress’s intent in balancing power in the CWA between the
States, private citizens and agencies, which permits citizens to
act only when the agency has failed to do so. Ellis v. Gallatin
Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 477 (6th Cir. 2004).
NUDEP’s settlement was procedurally distinguishable from
the rejected settlement in Laidlaw I because it offered the
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opportunity for citizen intervention within the meaning of CWA
Section 505. The court in Laidlaw I explained that the main
procedural defect was “the absence of a meaningful opportunity
for the citizen plaintiffs to intervene in this case” which
“trigger[ed] a heightened scrutiny into the settlement.” Laidlaw
I, 890 F. Supp. at 489-90. In Laidlaw I, the agency filed its
settlement only one day after filing its lawsuit, foreclosing any
opportunity for citizens to intervene. Id. The Laidlaw I court
further noted that “the complaint was filed at the [d]efendant’s
request, solely to accommodate the [d]efendant’s desire to bar a
citizen suit” and the defendant “drafted the state-court complaint
and settlement agreement, filed the lawsuit against itself, and
paid the filing fee. And finally the settlement agreement between
[the agency] and [defendant] was entered into with unusual
haste, without giving the [p]laintiffs the opportunity to
intervene.” Id. at 489. NUWF cannot claim any type of
procedural defect found in the Laidlaw I settlement. Rather than
attempt to intervene in NUDEP’s suit, NUWF brought its own
action twenty days later. (R. at 5). Unlike the Agency in Laidlaw
I, NUDEP waited nearly one month before filing its motion to
enter the consent decree. (R. at 5). The proposed consent decree
embodied a compromise diligently reached between NUDEP and
Bowman. (R. at 4). The fact that the agreement mirrored the
state lawsuit agreement simply reflects the fact that the state
statute mirrors the CWA. (R. at 4). To overturn the district
court’s diligence finding based on the sameness of the statutes
and their settlement terms would fashion a new rule which would
result in the absurd requirement that parties rehash identical
negotiations for identical statutes merely because the violations
are now brought before a federal court.
B. NUDEP’s Actions Culminating in its Federal
Lawsuit and the Proposed Consent Decree
Constitute Substantive Diligent Prosecution.
Besides procedural considerations, courts look to the
substance of consent decrees to determine if the presumption of
diligence has been rebutted. Laidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. at 490. The
Laidlaw I court discussed two non-dispositive factors to consider
when deciding whether a consent decree is substantively diligent:
“a state’s failure to enforce its consent order” and “lack of
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substantial relief.” Id. The court held that these factors must be
“viewed in light of all of the circumstances.” Id. at 491. In
considering all the circumstances, the court noted the deficiencies
alleged: (1) only requiring the defendant’s best effort to comply
with its permits, (2) lack of stipulated penalties for future
violations, (3) lack of liability for any violations occurring during
the order’s time while extending that time indefinitely into the
future, and (4) an overall lenient penalty. Id. at 490-91. In
fashioning remedies, agencies should consider the defendant’s
economic benefits from his non-compliance; however, the failure
to consider such benefits alone does not support a finding of nondiligent prosecution. Sierra Club v. ICG E., LLC, 833 F. Supp. 2d
571, 579 (N.D. W. Va. 2011) (clarifying the holding in Laidlaw I,
890 F. Supp. at 499).
While the severity of a penalty is one non-dispositive factor,
the Seventh Circuit explained that courts examine penalties for
future deterrent effect but do not require monetary penalties
when remedial penalties suffice. Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v.
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 762-63 (7th Cir.
2004). The Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers court stated, “[w]e
agree with the First Circuit that ‘[d]uplicative actions aimed at
exacting financial penalties in the name of environmental
protection at a time when remedial measures are well underway
do not further [the goals of the Clean Water Act]. They are, in
fact, impediments to environmental remedy efforts.’” Id. (citing
N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st
Cir. 1991). Thus, if courts were to require monetary penalties,
agencies’ delegated powers would be usurped in determining the
appropriate remedy to fulfill the goals of the CWA.
There are no allegations that NUDEP’s proposed consent
decree has any of the glaring substantive deficiencies found in
Laidlaw I, nor are there allegations that the decree attempts to
remove this Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the order. (R. at 4).
NUWF does not suggest that NUDEP will fail to enforce the
agreement. (R. at 4). Furthermore, NUDEP effectively obtained
an injunction requiring Bowman to cease and desist all clearing
activities and there are no allegations that the consent decree
granted Bowman any immunity from liability for future
violations. (R. at 4). Finally, while NUDEP did not seek
monetary penalties, it carefully considered the circumstances and
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determined that the most appropriate remedy would be obtained
by seeking substantial non-monetary penalties.
(R. at 4).
Bowman was required to actually cede control of a portion of his
land, granting a conservation easement open to the public, and
permanently stripping him of all development rights to it. (R. at
3-4). While only a small percentage of his land by acreage, this
concession was on prime river front acreage which he planned to
clear and use. (R. at 3-4). This concession removes one of the
property sticks from Bowman’s bundle and is likely to
permanently affect his land’s resale value. Bowman was also
required to improve some of his remaining land by constructing
at his cost a year-round wetland. (R. at 3-4). These nonmonetary penalties will actually benefit the NUWF members and
the public at large, demonstrating that NUDEP considered the
interests of all parties per its role as primary enforcer of the
CWA. Testimony from NUDEP’s biologist established that “the
new, year-round, partially-inundated wetland in the buffer zone
will provide richer wetland habitat than the former, occasionallyinundated wetland.” (R. at 6). The easement will allow NUWF
members to legally continue their frogging. (R. at 8). The district
court also found that the “easement shields the field from the
river, so that the aesthetics of navigational use of the river is
unaffected.” (R. at 6). In short, NUDEP has chosen to seek
remedial penalties and NUWF has not overcome its heavy burden
to rebut the presumption of NUDEP’s diligence negotiating the
administrative order and proposed consent decree.
IV. BOWMAN’S DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS IN A
WETLAND WITHOUT A PERMIT VIOLATED
CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404.
The CWA clearly states that “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The CWA
defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from a point source.” 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12) (2006). The CWA then defines pollutant as “dredged
spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage. . .,
chemical wastes, biological materials. . ., rock, sand, cellar dirt
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into
water.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The government “may issue
permits. . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
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navigable waters. . . and is authorized to enforce “[v]iolations of
permits.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (s) (2006).
The EPA has defined the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1344 to
differentiate between dredged and fill materials in 33 C.F.R. §
323.2. In the instant case, Bowman does not dispute that he used
a bulldozer as a point source to clear a wetland and that he did
not first obtain a permit for the activities. (R. at 8, 9). Nor has
NUDEP’s authority to prosecute violations of the CWA been
questioned. (R. at 4). At issue is whether Bowman’s activities
meet the requirements for the EPA’s interpretation of addition of
dredged material, which is defined to include the redeposit of said
materials. Furthermore, even if this Court decides that the
substances constituted fill material, case law repeatedly defines
actions such as Bowman’s to fall within the definition for the
addition of a pollutant as a violation of Section 404.
A. Bowman Violated the CWA by Redepositing
Dredged Materials into a Wetland without a
Section 404 Permit.
For the purposes of enforcing the CWA, the EPA has stated
that “dredged material means material that is excavated or
dredged from waters of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c).
The EPA’s definition for “discharge of dredged material” is “any
addition of dredged material into, including the redeposit of
dredged material other than incidental fallback within, the
waters of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1). The EPA
specifically includes “excavated material. . . which is incidental to
any activity, including mechanized landclearing, ditching,
channelization, or other excavation.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii).
1. EPA regulations define the materials
Bowman redeposited into the wetland as
dredged material.
To emphasize that mechanized landclearing constitutes
dredging, Section 323.2 further states that “[a]ctivities that
involve only the cutting or removing of vegetation above the
ground (e.g., mowing, rotary cutting, and chainsawing)” and
where these activities do not disturb “the root system nor involves
mechanized pushing, dragging, or other similar activities that
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redeposit excavated soil material” shall not be considered
dredging. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(ii). Therefore, a wetland is
dredged by a landclearing machine used to disturb vegetation
below the ground surface.
Bowman and the district court contend that the excavated –
and subsequently redeposited material – constituted fill material,
rather than dredged material, and is therefore not subject to the
“redeposit” definition of 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1). The district court
defines the verb “dredge” as “an activity that occurs on open
water to excavate a channel or port docking area to make them
available for commercial navigation.” (R. at 8). However, this is
merely one narrow meaning of the word “dredge” and the district
court ignored both the EPA’s definition and the plain meaning of
the term. The definition of “dredge” as a verb is “to dig, gather, or
pull out with or as if with a dredge.” Webster’s Unabridged
Dictionary 595 (2d ed. 1999).
Furthermore, Section
323.2(d)(1)(iii) provides “dredge” with a clearly different meaning
than the district court when it includes the term “landclearing” as
a method of adding or redepositing dredged material. The district
court ignored both the plain meaning and the EPA’s own
interpretation of the definition for “dredged material” by
expanding the word “dredge” beyond its dictionary definition and
clear meaning in the EPA’s regulations.
2. Bowman violated the CWA when he
redeposited the dredged material into the
wetland.
The EPA defines the addition of “dredged material” to
include redeposit of excavated soil and vegetation. 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(d)(1)(iii). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit concluded in
Avoyelles that by using a bulldozer to clear a wetland of
vegetation and depositing the resulting debris into sloughs, the
landowners had redeposited either fill or dredged materials in
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc.
v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983). The Avoyelles court
also held that “the term ‘discharge’ covers the redepositing of
materials taken from the wetlands.” Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 923.
The Fourth Circuit agrees with this analysis in United States v.
Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2000), when it states that
once a material is excavated from a wetland, the resulting dirt
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and vegetation becomes dredged spoil upon its redeposit into
navigable waters due to its harmful effect on the environment.
The Court’s ruling is bolstered by EPA regulations which state
that exemption from CWA permit requirements do not include
“mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization and other
excavation activity in a water of the United States, which would
result in a redeposit of dredged material.”
33 C.F.R. §
323.2(d)(3)(i). The Eleventh Circuit similarly held that dredging
by tugboat propellers which “redeposit[ed] the vegetation and
sediment on the adjacent sea grass beds” and “cut into the
bottom, uprooting and destroying the sea grass” constituted
addition of a pollutant in violation of the CWA. United States v.
M.C.C. of Fl., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
As explained by the EPA and courts, addition of dredged
material includes its redeposit. Bowman’s activities are precisely
the kind of landclearing activities defined by the EPA to
constitute addition in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2. The district court
supplanted its judgment for the EPA’s definition of “dredged
material” when it stated, “[l]and clearing is not dredging, so we
have no dredged spoil to discharge here” and provided no
authority for its revised definition. (R. at 8).
When a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of its own
statute, the court first looks to see “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). However, “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Here,
“[n]either the CWA nor the legislative history addresses the
precise question of what constitutes a ‘discharge of dredged
material’ in wetlands” or landclearing activities. William S.
Pufko, The Revised Definition of “Discharge of Dredged Material”:
Its Legality, Practicality, and Impact on Wetlands Protection, 9
Envtl. Law. 187, 226 (2002). Because Section 404 is ambiguous,
Chevron analysis proceeds to the second step. The EPA’s
promulgated rule defining dredged material to include redeposit
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from landclearing activities is “is based on sound science and ‘the
nature of earth-moving equipment.’” Id. at 228. The EPA made
this conclusion “[i]n light of the broad policy goals of the CWA
and the agencies’ expertise, their interpretation warrants
deference as a reasonable interpretation of their section 404
jurisdiction.” Id. at 228-29. Yet, the district court failed to give
the proper deference to the EPA’s regulatory interpretation.
As the district court has found that Bowman performed
mechanized landclearing to remove live vegetation from above
and below the surface of lands that were properly designated as
wetlands, the material that Bowman created is defined as
“dredged material” by the EPA, not fill material. (R. at 8, 9); 33
C.F.R. § 323.2. Bowman destroyed the wetland on his property in
order to create arable farmland for the production of wheat
without first obtaining a permit. (R. at 4). Therefore, NUDEP
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the lower court
and find that Bowman be found in violation of Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.
B. Bowman’s Activities Would Still Violate CWA
Section 404’s Addition Requirement if
Considered Fill Material.
The CWA prohibits the “addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source,” but the CWA does not
define “addition.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). However, the EPA does
define “addition” in its regulations, contrary to the district court’s
opinion. (R. at 9). As explained above, Bowman’s material
clearly fits the definition of addition of “dredged material” as
defined in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d). Even if this Court were to
consider the Bowman material to be fill material under 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(e), Bowman’s actions still constitute “addition.”
Fill material is defined as “material placed in waters of the
United States where the material has the effect of: (i) Replacing
any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii)
Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the
United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1). Addition of fill material
is defined to “generally include[], without limitation. . . sitedevelopment fills for recreational, industrial, commercial,
residential, or other uses.” 33 C.F.R. 323.2(f) (emphasis added).
Bowman’s fill of the wetland for commercial agricultural use
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clearly falls within the meaning of the Agency’s definition of
addition of fill material.
1. Courts have consistently interpreted
activities like Bowman’s to fall within the
CWA’s meaning of addition of “fill material.”
The district court incorrectly interpreted the Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Gorsuch case, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), to create a
hard and fast “from the outside world” rule for the addition of fill
material. (R. at 9). However, the Gorsuch court did not actually
rule on the meaning of the term “addition.” Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at
175.
The Gorsuch case merely deferred to the EPA’s
interpretation of “addition” in relation to the specific facts of that
case, stating that the “EPA’s interpretation must be accepted
unless manifestly unreasonable.”
Id.
Incorporating EPApromulgated definitions of addition of fill material in 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(f), courts have consistently recognized the meaning of
“addition” to include activities such as Bowman’s.
In Avoyelles, the defendant owned a forested tract of land
within a seasonably flooded river basin, eighty percent of which
was determined to be wetland. Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 901, 903.
The defendant decided to clear the land for agricultural use and
used “bulldozers. . . [to] cut the timber and vegetation at or just
above ground level. The trees were then raked into windrows,
burned, and the stumps and ashes were disced into the ground,”
leveling the tract. Id. at 901, 923. The landowner also created a
drainage ditch. Id. The court held “that the landowners were
discharging ‘fill material’ into the wetlands” without a permit, in
violation of CWA Section 404. Id. at 925. The court based its
determination on 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 to find that the clearing and
leveling “chang[ed] the bottom elevation of the waterbody,” and
“replaced the aquatic area with dry land” and was in effect the
addition of fill material. Id. at 924-25.
The Supreme Court and other appeals courts have
similarly rejected the “outside world” theory that the district
court used. In Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 99 (2002), the
Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s decision when the
defendant sought to convert wetlands into orchards and
vineyards without a CWA Section 404 permit. Id. at 812. The
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Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that an activity was not
“the ‘addition’ of a ‘pollutant’ into wetlands, because it simply
churns up soil that is already there, placing it back basically
where it came from.” Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d. at 814. It held
that the argument was inconsistent with prior precedent from the
Ninth and other circuits “that squarely hold that redeposits of
materials can constitute an ‘addition of a pollutant’ under the
Clean Water Act.” Id. at 814.
The Seventh Circuit recently agreed that the outside world
concept would not be “compatible with the purpose of the CWA to
‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.’” Greenfield Mills, Inc. v.
Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 948-49 (7th Cir. 2004). That court went
on to say “it is logical to believe that soil and vegetation removed
from one part of a wetland or waterway and deposited in another
[contiguous or adjacent] could disturb the ecological balance of
the affected areas – both the area from which the material was
removed and the area on which the material was deposited.”
Greenfield Mills, 361 F.3d at 948-49.
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d
331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000), explained that the CWA “does not
prohibit the addition of material; it prohibits the ‘addition of any
pollutant.’” The court found it quite obvious that “there could be
an addition of a pollutant without an addition of material. . . at
least when an activity transforms some material from a
nonpollutant into a pollutant.” Deaton, 209 F.3d at 335. The
court then pointed out that the earth and vegetable matter that
was removed from the wetland became “a statutory pollutant and
a type of material that up until then was not present on the
[defendants’] property.” Id. at 335. The court recognized the
important difference between soil and vegetation in its natural
state and in its disturbed state when it held that “[i]t is of no
consequence that what is now [a statutory pollutant] was
previously present on the same property in the less threatening
form.” Id. at 335-36. The court then went on to find that the
defendant had “added a pollutant where none had been before.”
Id. (emphasis added).
The district court ignores both EPA regulations and prior
judicial precedent when it calls the distinction in Deaton an
“imaginative piece of verbal metaphysics [which] only masks
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reality.” (R. at 10). The district court cites Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), and the
EPA’s unitary navigable water theory, to argue that it does not
“matter that the defendant’s actions changed the nature of some
of the material from living to dead.” (R. at 10). The Second
Circuit distinguished the Gorsuch and Consumers Power cases by
noting that they were based on deference to the EPA’s position
compiled by the court from “informal policy statements made and
consistent litigation positions taken by the EPA over the years,
primarily in the 1970s and 1980s.” Catskill Mountains Chapter
of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 490
(2d Cir. 2001). The court went on to point out that “[r]ecent
Supreme Court cases emphasize that such agency statements do
not deserve broad deference of the sort accorded by the Gorsuch
and Consumers Power courts.” Id.
The district court found that Bowman used bulldozers to
level and push vegetation into windrows, where they were then
burned. (R. at 4). He then dug trenches, filling them with
vegetation and ash, and drained the leveled field by forming a
wide ditch. (R. at 4). Because Bowman’s activities were nearly
identical to those in the Fifth Circuit Avoyelles case and very
similar to the above cases in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and
Ninth (affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court) Circuits, this Court
should recognize the overwhelming trend among courts that such
activities constitute the addition of a pollutant in violation of the
CWA.
C. The District Court Misapplied the EPA’s
“Unitary Navigable Waters” Theory by
Incorrectly Applying it to Dredged or Fill
Material that Did Not Already Exist in the
Waters of the United States.
Even ignoring the recent Supreme Court rulings cited by
the Second Circuit and the reasoning in the above circuits,
Bowman’s activities – and the similar land clearing activities held
to be addition in the above cases – are distinguishable from the
activities in Consumers Power Co. In Consumers Power Co., live
fish entered the defendant’s power plant from a reservoir and a
mixture of live and dead fish were discharged into Lake
Michigan. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 582. The biological
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material was already in the waters of the United States
regardless of its status as live or dead. Id. The root and soil
material that Bowman dug up and moved around were already
part of those waters, much like the fish. However, Bowman’s
land clearing activities also took vegetation that was above the
soil, not physically dispersed in the waters of the United States,
and added it to those waters. (R. at 4). In other words, the fish in
Consumers and the roots and soil here were already interspersed
with the water of the wetland. Moving those materials around
may constitute dredging and redeposit, but such would not
displace more water. On the other hand, the vegetation that
previously had been entirely above the water would displace more
water when added to the wetland, falling squarely within the
EPA’s definition of addition of fill material by replacing a portion
of the water with dry material and changing the bottom elevation
of the water. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1).
Furthermore, Bowman did not simply change the status of
the plant material from living to dead, but chemically and
physically changed the material by burning it into ashes. (R. at
4). The charred remains of plant materials contain “[t]race
amounts of heavy metals such as lead, cadmium, nickel and
chromium” and a considerable amount of calcium carbonate,
which, as ash, “increases soil alkalinity” and can be harmful
depending on the soil and plant composition. Rosie B. Lerner,
Woodash in the Garden, Purdue University (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.hort.purdue.edu/ext/woodash.html. This ash material
simply did not exist prior to Bowman’s activities and was clearly
added to the wetlands, changing the physical and chemical
characteristics of the wetland. Consequently, it would run
counter to the CWA’s purpose of “[r]estoration and maintenance
of chemical, physical and biological integrity of Nation’s waters”
for this Court to exempt Bowman from a Section 404 permit. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a). Doing so would strip NUDEP of its ability to
determine the appropriateness of Bowman’s actions given the
physical, chemical, and biological complexities of wetlands.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, NUDEP respectfully requests that
this Court both affirm and reverse its grant of summary
judgment. Because NUWF has demonstrated an actual injury,
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the lower court improperly decided that NUWF does not have
standing to challenge Bowman’s violation of CWA Section 404.
The district court properly held under Gwaltney that all of
Bowman’s violations were wholly in the past for the purposes of
subject matter jurisdiction. Similarly, in its grant of summary
judgment, the lower court correctly determined that NUDEP’s
substantive and procedural prosecution of Bowman met the
standards of diligent prosecution as to bar NUWF’s suit. Finally,
this Court should reverse the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment to Bowman and find that he violated the CWA by
adding pollutants to his wetland without a permit.
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